We propose two new axioms of demand responsiveness for additive cost sharing with variable demands. Group Monotonicity requires that if a group of agents increase their demands, not all of them pay less. Solidarity says that if agent i demands more, j should not pay more if k pays less. Both axioms are compatible in the partial responsibility theory postulating Strong Ranking, i.e., the ranking of cost shares should never contradict that of demands. The combination of Strong Ranking , Solidarity and Monotonicity characterizes the quasi-proportional methods, under which cost shares are proportional to 'rescaled' demands.
Introduction
The traditional model of cooperative games is well suited to discuss cost-sharing problems where the demands of the participating agents are …xed (inelastic). Shapley (1953) and Weber (1988) showed how the simple axioms of Additivity (with respect to cost) and Dummy (an agent with zero marginal cost pays nothing) determine individual cost shares as a …xed average of marginal costs.
Following Aumann and Shapley's (1974) seminal contribution, the additive theory of cost sharing was extended to variable individual demands: agents i = 1; :::; n want a quantity x i of good i; and the problem is to split the total cost C(x 1 ; :::; x n ) using no other information than the cost function C: Applications range from the pricing of utilities such as water, phone or electricity, where the level of individual consumption a¤ects total cost, to the sharing of waiting time at a congested server (Shenker (1995) , Haviv (2001) ), and the division of highway construction costs between taxpayers (Lee (2002)).
A simple requirement of demand responsiveness has played a key role in the recent literature on axiomatic cost sharing. Monotonicity, introduced in Moulin (1995) and developed in Friedman and Moulin (1999) , stipulates that every user's cost share should be nondecreasing in her own demand. On the normative side, it expresses a weak form of responsibility for one's own demand. If goods are freely disposable, Monotonicity also has a positive interpretation: it prevents manipulation by arti…cial (and wasteful) increases of individual demands.
In this paper we propose a handful of new demand responsiveness axioms, some of them strengthening Monotonicity, and explore their impact in the additive theory of cost sharing. Our model and our three main axioms are presented in Section 2. We have a …nite number of users, individual demands are non negative integers, and the cost function is non decreasing, zero for zero demands, and otherwise arbitrary. We always assume that individual cost shares are non negative and depend additively upon the cost function.
Group Monotonicity requires that if a group of agents simultaneously increase their demands, not all of them pay less. Under the same premises, Strong Group Monotonicity states that the total cost share allocated to the group should not decrease. Both properties have dual normative/positive interpretations similar to those of Monotonicity. If side-payments are not feasible, Group Monotonicity is su¢cient to prevent manipulations by a coordinated arti…cial increase of demands; if they are feasible, we need the latter, stronger property.
Our third main axiom is Solidarity. It requires that a demand change by one agent a¤ects the share of all other agents in the same direction: no one pays more if someone pays less. The recent literature on fair division explores the Solidarity idea in a number of allocation problems (Thomson (1999) , Sprumont and Zhou (1999) ), but this is its …rst application to cost sharing.
A natural family of methods meeting all demand responsiveness properties above are the quasi-proportional methods computing i C (x); where s is is an arbitrary nondecreasing "scaling function". These simple and familiar methods only take the actual cost into account, and divide it in proportion to rescaled individual demands. Theorem 1 in Section 3 characterizes this family by combining Solidarity, Monotonicity, and one more axiom called Strong Ranking. The latter requires cost shares to be ranked in the same order as the corresponding demands, for any cost function, symmetric or not.
Strong Ranking is the de…ning axiom of the "partial responsibility" theory of cost sharing (Moulin and Sprumont (2002) ). Agents, while responsible for their demands, are not responsible for the asymmetries of the cost function. This justi…es some cross-subsidization. We submit that this viewpoint inspires cost sharing rules for many publicly provided services: disabled customers are not charged more for transportation services, the same stamp buys delivery of mail to central or remote areas, and so on.
The alternative view that agents are responsible for cost asymmetries is the basis of the more familiar "full responsibility" theory. This view leads to the principle of no cross subsidization pervading the natural monopoly literature (Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982) , Sharkey (1982) ), and to the related Dummy axiom in the model of cooperative games. In our setting the relevant formulation is the Separability axiom: if the cost function is additively separable (C(z) = P i c i (z i ) for all z), each agent should pay her stand-alone cost c i (x i ).
The impact of our demand responsiveness conditions under full responsibility is the subject of Sections 4 and 5. Proposition 2 states that neither Solidarity nor Strong Group Monotonicity is compatible with Separability. On the other hand Group Monotonicity is a very demanding yet achievable property. The simple method charging incremental costs according to a …xed ordering of the users is an example. More generally, a …xed-path method charging incremental costs according to a …xed ordering of the di¤erent units of demand, is group-monotonic. However Group Monotonicity is typically not preserved by convex combinations of cost sharing methods. For instance the Shapley-Shubik method (Shubik (1962) ), applying the Shapley value to the stand-alone cooperative game at the given demand pro…le, is not group-monotonic. Thus this property yields a powerful critique of both the oldest cost-sharing method in the literature, and of the most popular one, the Aumann-Shapley method (the latter violates even Monotonicity).
Proposition 3 in Section 4 is an important positive result, allowing us to construct "reasonable" group-monotonic methods in the full responsibility approach. Any convex combination of "nearby" …xed-path methods is group-monotonic as well. The most natural method constructed in this fashion is the subsidy-free serial method (Moulin (1995) ), adapting serial cost sharing to our discrete model.
If Solidarity is out of reach in the full responsibility theory, a weaker version of this property is feasible when the cost function is submodular. In that case an increase in user i 0 s demand is a positive externality on other users, and our Submodular Solidarity axiom in Section 5 rules out changes of opposite signs in their cost shares. We introduce the rich family of …xed- ‡ow methods, corresponding to convex combinations of …xed-path methods, and containing for instance the Shapley-Shubik and subsidy-free serial methods. Theorem 2 characterizes this family by the combination of Separability, Monotonicity, and Submodular Solidarity.
Section 6 compares our results under partial and full responsibility. While the quasi-proportional methods satisfy Solidarity, the cross e¤ects of a demand shift may not have the expected sign. For instance, if C is supermodular and x i increases, agent j's cost share,
C(x); may go down. We introduce the Positive Externalities and Negative Externalities axioms: if agent i's demand raises, all agents j other than i bene…t when costs are submodular, and su¤er when costs are supermodular. We show in Proposition 4 that these properties are essentially incompatible with partial responsibility: no cost-sharing method satis…es Strong Ranking and Positive Externalities, and the only method satisfying Additivity, Strong Ranking and Negative Externalities divides costs equally no matter what. By contrast, the axioms are easy to meet under full responsibility: the …xed- ‡ow methods as well as the AumannShapley method satisfy Positive and Negative Externalities (Proposition 5).
Section 7 takes a second look at the partial responsibility theory. Moulin and Sprumont (2002) introduce Weak Separability, ruling out cross-subsidization when it is not implied by Strong Ranking, namely when the cost function takes the form C(z) = P i c(z i ). While the quasi-proportional methods violate Weak Separability, the axiom is compatible with partial responsibility, i.e., with Strong Ranking. The simplest example is the cross-subsidizing serial method (Sprumont (1998) ). This method is also group-monotonic (Proposition 6). Yet Strong Group Monotonicity is incompatible with the combination of Weak Separability and Strong Ranking (Proposition 7).
The model and the demand responsiveness axioms
Each agent i 2 N = f1; :::; ng demands an integer quantity x i 2 N = f0; 1; :::g of a personalized good. The cost of meeting the demand pro…le x 2 N N must be split among the members of N: A cost function is a mapping C : N N ! R + that is nondecreasing and satis…es C (0) = 0; the set of such mappings is denoted C . A (costsharing) method ' assigns to each problem (C; x) 2 C£N N a vector of nonnegative cost shares '(C; x) 2 R N + such that P ' i (C; x) = C(x): We call '(:; x) a (cost-sharing)
method at x: We use the following notation. Vector inequalities are written ·; <; ¿. For any
and ]x; x 0 [ are de…ned similarly. We let N(x) = fi 2 N j x i > 0g and write n(x) = jN(x)j : For any S µ N, we denote by x S 2 N S the restriction of x to S and we write x(S) = P i2S x i : We de…ne e S 2 N N by e S i = 1 if i 2 S and 0 otherwise. We sometimes write i for fig; ij for fi; jg; and ¡S for NnS: If i 2 N and C 2 C, we de…ne @ i C :
The requirement that cost shares be nonnegative is part of our de…nition of a method. Nonnegativity is a minimal form of demand responsiveness. It does rule out well-known procedures such as equal split beyond stand-alone costs,
and the marginal cost procedure
where
Throughout the paper, we restrict our attention to additive methods.
Additivity. For any C; C 0 2 C and
This powerful mathematical property is devoid of ethical content. Additive costsharing methods are very convenient in practice. When production can be decomposed into the sum of several independent processes (like research, production and marketing; or construction and maintenance), applying the method to each subprocess and adding the resulting cost shares is equivalent to applying the method to the consolidated cost function. The proper level of application of the method is not a matter of dispute.
We now de…ne four demand responsiveness conditions. The …rst one is the familiar Monotonicity (Moulin (1995)) requiring individual cost shares to be monotonic in the corresponding demands.
Monotonicity. For all C 2 C ; x; x 0 2 N N ; and i 2 N, fx i < x 0 i and
When communication between agents is easy, demand coordination is a concern. We propose a group version of Monotonicity requiring that, when several agents increase simultaneously their demands, not all of them pay less.
Group Monotonicity. For any C 2 C , any x; x 0 2 N N ; and any nonempty S µ N; fx i < x 0 i for all i 2 S and
A natural strengthening of Group Monotonicity evaluates the impact of demand increases followed by side-payments. When money transfers between agents are feasible, John may be willing to strategically raise his demand if the corresponding drop in some other agents' shares more than compensates the increase in John's share. Strong Group Monotonicity prevents such manipulations.
Strong Group Monotonicity. For any C 2 C; x; x 0 2 N N ; any nonempty S µ N and i 2 S; fx i < x 0 i and x j = x 0 j for all j 2 Nnfigg ) f
Clearly Strong Group Monotonicity also rules out the pro…tability of a coordinated increase by several members of S followed by side-payments within S:
Our last demand responsiveness axiom requires that all members of a group should be treated similarly whenever a demand change occurs outside the group.
Solidarity. For any C 2 C; any i 2 N; and any
We conclude this section by noting the following connection between our axioms. Proposition 1. Every cost-sharing method satisfying Additivity, Solidarity, and Monotonicity satis…es Strong Group Monotonicity.
Proof. The subset D = fC 2 C j C(z) 2 f0; 1g for all z 2 N N g of cost functions taking the values 0 or 1 plays a central role in this and several subsequent proofs, in particular that of Theorem 1*. Every C 2 C is a nonnegative linear combination of cost functions in D. Thus an additive method ' meets Strong Group Monotonicity if and only if for all C 2 D and
If
which is clearly implied by the combination of Solidarity and Monotonicity.
3. Demand responsiveness and partial responsibility: the quasi-proportional methods This section is devoted to the quasi-proportional methods discussed in the Introduction.
C(x) for all i; C; and x; where s : N ! R + is nondecreasing and s(1) > 0 (with the convention that '(C; 0) = 0). Examples include the egalitarian method ' i (C; x) = 1 n C(x) and the proportional method ' i (C; x) =
These methods meet Additivity, Monotonicity, and Solidarity, hence, by Proposition 1, satisfy all the demand responsiveness axioms of Section 2. No information about "counter-factual" costs is used in computing the cost shares, which are therefore completely insensitive to the asymmetries in the cost structure. In particular, agents who ask more pay more, regardless of the cost function.
Strong Ranking. For all C 2 C, x 2 N N ; and i; j 2 N;
This de…nes the "partial responsibility" theory of cost sharing in which agents are held responsible for the size of their own demand but not for the idiosyncrasies of the cost function. Note that the egalitarian method barely satis…es Strong Ranking: it violates the strict version requiring that the ranking of cost shares be identical to that of demands when the cost function is strictly monotonic. The proportional method is more responsive to demands; its simplicity makes it very popular in practice.
We now show that Additivity, Solidarity, Monotonicity and Strong Ranking essentially characterize the quasi-proportional methods. The precise statement requires a couple of additional de…nitions. Notice …rst that the egalitarian method possesses a property slightly stronger than Solidarity, Strict Solidarity. For any C 2 C; any i 2 N; and any x; x 0 2 N N ; fx j = x 0 j for all
which the proportional method fails because agents demanding zero are never a¤ected by changes in others' demands.
On the other hand, the proportional method meets
Zero Cost for Zero Demand. For any C 2 C; any i 2 N; and any x 2 N N ;
which the egalitarian method obviously fails. This axiom is compelling if agents are not responsible for the demands of others 
which is a strong but simple interpretation of responsibility for one's demand 2 . We are now ready to state our …rst main result.
Theorem 1.
i) Assume n¸4: A cost-sharing method ' satis…es Additivity, Strong Ranking, Strict Solidarity, and Monotonicity if and only if there exists a nondecreasing function s : N ! R such that s(0) > 0 and
for all C 2 C; i 2 N; and Choosing a positive constant a and setting s(t) = t + a for all t; equation (2) de…nes a hybrid method approaching the egalitarian method when a ! 1 and the proportional one when a ! 0: Any such method meets Strict Solidarity.
Four observations are in order.
(1) Theorem 1 is a corollary to Theorem 1* and Lemma 2, stated and proved in the Appendix, which dispense with Strong Ranking. Dropping Strong Ranking allows for a family including more complicated methods, of which two interesting subclasses are easily described.
Consider …rst the methods '(C; x) = µ(x)C(x); where µ(x) is an arbitrary mapping from N N nf0g to ¢. We call such methods simple: they completely ignore the shape of the cost function and reduce the cost-sharing problem to a "general claim arbitration" problem (where the amount to be divided may exceed or fall short of the sum of the claims) as in Herrero, Maschler and Villar (1999) and Naumova (2002) .
from Additivity and Separability: see Section 4), Zero Cost for Zero Demand must be explicitly required in the partial responsibility theory.
It follows from the proof of Theorem 1* that a simple method meets Additivity, Solidarity and Monotonicity if and only if it is an asymmetric quasi-proportional method, i.e.,
for all i 2 N; where s i : N ! R + is nondecreasing and s i (1) > 0: A second interesting subclass meeting our three axioms consists of the methods
for all i; C; and x; where¸2 [0; 1]. For¸= 0; this is just the egalitarian method. Setting¸= n ¡ 1 yields "equal split beyond stand-alone costs" introduced in Section 2, which however does not guarantee nonnegative cost shares. The nonnegativity constraints force¸between 0 and 1: These methods split equally the balance above a fraction of stand-alone costs. The entire family of methods meeting Additivity, Monotonicity and Solidarity combines features of these methods and the quasi-proportional methods: see the Appendix for details.
(2) Replacing the combination of Solidarity and Monotonicity by Strong Group Monotonicity (which is implied: recall Proposition 1) allows for many more methods. For instance, the simple methods '(C; x) = µ(x)C(x) satisfy Strong Group Monotonicity if and only if µ i is non-increasing in x j for any two distinct i; j (which is much less restrictive than the asymmetric quasi-proportional form (3)) and Strong Ranking if and only if µ i (x) · µ j (x) , x i · x j for any i; j and x. Characterizing the entire class of methods meeting Additivity, Strong Group Monotonicity and Strong Ranking is a challenging open problem.
(3) All methods in Theorem 1 satisfy a requirement stronger than Solidarity. When an arbitrary subset of agents change their demands, the impact on the cost shares of the others goes in the same direction: for any C 2 C; any S µ N; and any
(4) The egalitarian method occupies a special place within the quasi-proportional methods, because it meets a much stronger version of the Solidarity axiom:
Full Solidarity. For any C 2 C ; any i 2 N; and any x; x 0 2 N N ; fx i < x 0 i and
This axiom strengthens both Solidarity and Monotonicity. It characterizes the …xed-proportions methods: a cost-sharing method ' satis…es Additivity and Full Sol-idarity if and only if there exists¸2 ¢ such that '(C; x) = C(x)¸for all C 2 C and x 2 N N : We omit the easy proof 3 .
Demand Responsiveness and full responsibility
We turn to demand responsiveness properties within the familiar "full responsibility" approach, where agents are responsible for the idiosyncrasies of the cost function. The de…ning axiom says that everyone should pay the cost of their own demand whenever that cost does not depend on others agents' demands.
All quasi-proportional methods violate Separability. More fundamentally, the axiom is incompatible with Strong Ranking even in the absence of Additivity. Suppose costs are additively separable (C(z) = P c i (x i )) and i's stand-alone cost exceeds j 's at all levels (c i (t) > c j (t) for all t > 0). If x i = x j ; Strong Ranking imposes equal cost shares for i and j while Separability requires that i pays more than j.
Under Additivity, Separability is equivalent to the more familiar Dummy axiom requiring that dummy agents pay nothing: for all C 2 C ; x 2 N N ; and i 2 N,
The combination of Additivity and Separability is well understood. Moulin and Vohra (2003) o¤er a representation in terms of ‡ows. A conservative unit ‡ow -or simply, a ‡ow-to a demand pro…le
Lemma 1 (Moulin and Vohra (2003)).
A method ' satis…es Additivity and Separability if and only if, for every x 2 N N , there is a (necessarily unique) ‡ow f (:; x) to x such that
for all C 2 C and all i 2 N; we call f the ‡ow representation of ':
An important consequence of this representation is the following property.
Independence of Irrelevant Costs. For all x 2 N N and
The simplest separable additive methods correspond to ‡ows f (:; x) mapping [0; x[ into f0; 1g N : In this case the entire ‡ow runs along a monotone path from 0 to x in the integer grid. Fix such a path. At each step of the path, the coordinate of exactly one agent increases by one. Charging to this agent the corresponding cost increase and summing over the entire path de…nes a cost-sharing method at the demand pro…le x: Formally, any sequence of agents ¼ : f1; :::; x(N)g ! N such that j¼ ¡1 (i)j = x i for each i 2 N, de…nes a monotone path z
for t = 1; :::; x(N): This path, in turn, generates the ‡ow
and f i (z; x) = 0 otherwise. The corresponding cost shares at x are
for all i 2 N and C 2 C. If, for every demand pro…le x; '(:; x) is generated by a monotone path to x; we say that ' is path-generated. Wang (1999) shows that a method satis…es Additivity and Separability if and only if it is the pointwise limit of convex combinations of path-generated methods. Note that if we restrict attention to a bounded subset of demand pro…les, the two axioms characterize simply the (…xed) convex combinations of path-generated methods. Example 1. The Aumann-Shapley 5 method ' as solves every problem (C; x) by averaging the cost-share vectors ' ¼ (C; x) generated along all paths ¼ to x. In the corresponding ‡ow representation, f as i (z; x) equals the proportion of paths to x which go through z and z + e i : straightforward computations yield f (Shubik (1962) ) averages the cost shares computed along the paths that follow the edges of the cube [0; x[: Letting E i (x) = fz 2 [0; x[j 8j 2 Nni; z j 2 f0; x j gg, the ‡ow associated with ' ss (:; x) is given by f
Example 3. The subsidy-free serial method ' sf (Moulin (1995) ) averages the cost shares computed along the paths that follow the "constrained diagonal" to x. Let
We are now ready to describe the consequences of our four demand responsiveness conditions under full responsibility. First, we note that the two strongest conditions are incompatible with Additivity and Separability.
Proposition 2. Suppose n¸3: Then i) no cost-sharing method satis…es Additivity, Separability, and Solidarity; ii) no cost-sharing method satis…es Additivity, Separability, and Strong Group Monotonicity.
Proof. Statement i) We establish the incompatibility for n = 3; the extension to n¸3 follows immediately by considering cost functions where all but three agents are dummies. Let ' satisfy the three stated axioms and let f be its ‡ow representation as in formula (5). Let x = e 12 ; x 0 = e 123 : De…ne
Thus by Independence of Irrelevant Costs and Separability
On the other hand
The latter equality holds as well if
Thus f 2 (e 3 ; x 0 ) = 0: A similar argument involving C 2 instead of C 1 gives f 1 (e 3 ; x 0 ) = 0: Now ‡ow conservation yields f 3 (0; x 0 ) = 0: By exchanging the roles of the agents, we get similarly f i (0; x 0 ) = 0 for i = 1; 2; a contradiction to the de…nition of a conservative unit ‡ow.
Statement ii) The proof mimics that of statement i): the …rst paragraph is unchanged; then apply Strong Group Monotonicity to C 1 (with i = 3 and S = f1; 3g)
(with i = 3 and S = f2; 3g) to get f 1 (e 3 ; x 0 ) = 0: The rest is unchanged.
By contrast to Proposition 2, Monotonicity and Group Monotonicity are compatible with Additivity and Separability. Both have a lot of bite. As mentioned in the Introduction, the Aumann-Shapley method is not monotonic 6 . The Shapley-Shubik method is monotonic, but not group-monotonic. We only prove the latter statement. 6 A simple counterexample has two agents and the cost function ± (1;1) (z) = 1 for all z¸(1; 1) and ± (1 ;1) (z) = 0 otherwise. Then ' as (± (1 ;1) ; (1; 1)) = ( ) and ' as (± (1 ;1) ; (2; 1)) = ( ); a contradiction to Monotonicity.
Let N = f1; 2; 3g and C be the cost function: The characterization of all methods meeting Additivity, Separability and Group Monotonicity remains an open problem. In the rest of this section, we construct a fairly rich family of such methods.
We start with the …xed-path methods. Any …xed sequence ¼ : Nnf0g ! N generates an in…nite …xed path
is in…nite for each i 2 N; we call the sequence ¼ unbounded ; the corresponding …xed path is unbounded in each coordinate (i.e., z ¼ i (t) = jfs 2 ¼ ¡1 (i) j s · tgj goes to in…nity as t grows): To any demand pro…le x 2 N N , we associate a sequence ¼ x : f1; :::; x(N)g ! N by keeping the …rst x i occurrences of each i : for instance, if n = 3; x = (1; 4; 2) and ¼ = 1; 2; 3; 1; 2; 3; 1; 2; 3; :::; then ¼ x = 1; 2; 3; 2; 3; 2; 2: The sequence ¼ x in turn generates the monotone path z ¼ x to x and the associated cost-sharing method '
To see why such methods satisfy Group Monotonicity, …x ¼ and x: For each i 2 N let t i (¼; x) be the smallest integer t such that z 
Fixed-path methods are asymmetric. To restore symmetry, we could take convex combinations of such methods, but the example of the Shapley-Shubik method demonstrates that in general this operation will not preserve Group Monotonicity. Interestingly, taking convex combinations of "su¢ciently close" …xed-path methods does preserve Group Monotonicity. Formally, let ¼ be a …xed unbounded sequence and let i; j 2 N: Construct ¼ ij : Nnf0g ! fi; jg by deleting from ¼ all occurrences of agents in Nnfi; j g: This sequence generates the projection of z ¼ on N fi;jg ; denoted z
fi;jg ; in the usual way. We say that two …xed unbounded sequences ¼; ¾ are nearby if for all i; j 2 N and all t 2 N,
Proposition 3. If f¼ 1 ; :::; ¼ K g is a family of unbounded sequences which are pairwise nearby, and¸1; :::;¸K are nonnegative numbers summing up to 1, then P K k=1¸k ' ¼k satis…es Additivity, Separability, and Group Monotonicity. In particular, the subsidyfree serial method (Example 3) satis…es these three axioms.
Proof. By Lemma 1, P K k=1¸k ' ¼ k meets Additivity and Separability. To check Group Monotonicity, …x C 2 C, S µ N; and x; x 0 2 N N such that x i < x 0 i for all i 2 S and
for all i 2 S: As explained previously, '
the opposite strict inequality is true,
) is computed along a path to x 0 which coincides, for all t · t i 1 (¼ k ; x); with the path to x along which '
It follows that the subsidy-free serial method meets the three axioms because ' sf is simply the arithmetic average of the n! methods generated by the …xed unbounded sequences p(1); p(2); :::; p(n); p(1); p(2); :::; p(n); ::: corresponding to the possible permutations p on N.
Our companion paper, Moulin and Sprumont (2002) , o¤ers a characterization of the subsidy-free serial method based on the property called Distributivity, and expressing for the composition of cost functions (with perfect substitute outputs) the same invariance as Additivity does for their addition.
The fixed-flow methods
Within the full responsibility theory, we explore now two axioms weakening, respectively, Strong Ranking and Solidarity. Separability is incompatible with Strong Ranking but is clearly compatible with the following weaker condition:
Ranking. For all C 2 C, x 2 N N ; and i; j 2 N; fC is a symmetric function of all its variables and
The restriction to symmetric cost functions is very natural: when C is symmetric, any di¤erence in cost shares must originate in di¤erences in demands, hence the ranking of cost shares should follow that of individual demands. Examples 1, 2, 3 all satisfy Ranking.
Next, Separability is incompatible with Solidarity (Proposition 2), but it is consistent with a restricted version of that axiom. Solidarity is very demanding when all types of production externalities are allowed, thus it is natural to limit its application to those cases where externalities are clearly signed. For any C 2 C ; i; j 2 N; and
The subsets of submodular and supermodular cost functions, respectively, are C sub = fC 2 C j @
with the convention that the sum is simply f i (z; x) if K = ;: Note that p x 0 f (:; x) is a ‡ow to x 0 . For simplicity, we state our characterization result for bounded cost-sharing problems: we …x x 2 (N µ nf0g) N the following statements are equivalent : i) ' is a …xed- ‡ow method; ii) ' satis…es Additivity, Separability, Monotonicity, and Submodular Solidarity; iii) ' satis…es Additivity, Separability, Monotonicity, and Supermodular Solidarity.
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We conclude this section with three comments. 1) Theorem 2 is tight. For a method satisfying all axioms but Additivity, let
C (x) unless C is additively separable, in which case we compute cost shares by applying Separability. A method violating only Separability is the proportional method ' i (C; x) = xi x(N)
2) Fixed ‡ow methods satisfy a stronger property than Dummy, called Strong Dummy: for all C 2 C, x 2 N N ; and i 2 N; f@ i C = 0g ) f' i (C; x) = 0 and ' j (C; x) = ' j (C; (0 i ; x ¡i )) for all j 2 Nnig: This follows by applying f(:; x 0 ) = p x 0 f (:; x) to x 0 = (0 i ; x ¡i ):However the combination of Additivity, Strong Dummy and Monotonicity is not enough to characterize the …xed ‡ow methods.
3) Theorem 2 suggests interesting open questions. Many …xed- ‡ow methods, including the Shapley-Shubik and subsidy-free serial methods, meet Ranking. If n = 2; all …xed- ‡ow methods on [0; x] where x 1 = x 2 and the ‡ow f is symmetric (f 1 (z; x) = f 2 ((z 2 ; z 1 ); x) for all z) meet Ranking. Surprisingly, this property does not generalize to n¸3: Here is an example of a method based on a symmetric ‡ow to x = x 1 e N that violates Ranking. Let n = 3; x = (3; 3; 3); and consider the six monotone paths to x de…ned by the sequence 1; 2; 1; 2; 1; 3; 2; 3; 3 and the …ve sequences obtained from it by permuting agents. Let f be the (fully symmetric) ‡ow on [0; x] obtained by putting an equal weight on these six paths, and let ' be the resulting …xed- ‡ow method. Consider the cost function
0 otherwise, where Z ¤ = f(1; 2; 2); (2; 1; 2); (2; 2; 1); (3; 1; 1); (1; 3; 1); (1; 1; 3)g: The function C is symmetric in all its variables, and one computes '(C; (3; 2; 1)) = ( ); in contradiction of Ranking. This raises the problem of determining which …xed- ‡ow methods meet Ranking.
Characterizing the class of …xed- ‡ow methods meeting Group Monotonicity is another challenging open problem. ): A symmetrical argument handles the case x 1 > x 2 : This shows that ' is the egalitarian method on the cost functions ± z : As every cost function coincides on every [0; x] with a linear combination of such functions, the claim follows by Additivity.
Comparing the partial and full responsibility approaches
By contrast, the …xed- ‡ow methods satisfy Positive and Negative Externalities. Many more separable methods meet these axioms: an important example is the Aumann-Shapley method. The proof of the following result is in the Appendix.
Proposition 5. The …xed- ‡ow methods and the Aumann-Shapley method satisfy Positive Externalities and Negative Externalities.
To sum up, Strong Ranking is compatible with Solidarity but the direction of the cross-e¤ects may be counter-intuitive; Separability is consistent with a limited form of solidarity only but the cross-e¤ects may be guaranteed to have the expected sign.
Weak separability
This section takes a second look at the partial responsibility theory. In Moulin and Sprumont (2002) we argue that a sound theory of partial responsibility should perform cross-subsidization to correct for cost asymmetries, and for that purpose only. Subsidization is not justi…ed when the cost function is symmetric: in such cases, the separability principle still applies. Thus if the cost function is not only symmetric but also additively separable, each agent will pay her "own" separable cost:
All quasi-proportional methods violate Weak Separability. For instance, if n = 2; x 1 < x 2 ; and C (z) = c(z 1 ) + c(z 2 ), the proportional method cross-subsidizes agent 2 at 1's expense when c is convex, and vice-versa when c is concave.
Yet, Weak Separability is compatible with Strong Ranking. A complete description of the methods meeting Additivity, Weak Separability, and Strong Ranking is o¤ered in Lemma 3 in the Appendix. A key member of that class is the crosssubsidizing serial method de…ned in Sprumont (1998) 8 . 
The cost shares for an arbitrary problem obtain by applying the formula after reordering the coordinates of the demand pro…le in nondecreasing order.
Proposition 6. The cross-subsidizing serial method satis…es Strong Ranking, Weak Separability, and Group Monotonicity. It fails Solidarity and Strong Group Monotonicity.
We omit the easy proof of these two statements. The violation of Strong Group Monotonicity is a consequence of a general incompatibility recorded in the next proposition; see the Appendix for a proof. Proposition 7. If n¸3; no cost-sharing method satis…es Additivity, Strong Ranking, Weak Separability, and Strong Group Monotonicity.
We conjecture that a similar incompatibility holds when Strong Group Monotonicity is replaced with Solidarity. The vector r(z; j; x) speci…es how the ‡ow f j (z; x) between z and z + e j is shared among the agents. Choosing for each demand pro…le x a ‡ow f (:; x) and a sharing rule r(:; :; x); the formula
for all C 2 C de…nes an additive cost-sharing method. Keep in mind that r is vectorvalued while @ j C and f j are scalar-valued. Conversely, Moulin and Vohra (2003) show that all additive methods possess at least one such shared- ‡ow representation (f; r): Observe that these methods meet Independence of Irrelevant Costs. and F (x) = (F 1 (x); :::; F n (x)) Next, choose a function ¹ i assigning a real number to every pair (x i ; t i ) 2 (Nnf0g) 2 such that t i · x i : For every cost-sharing problem (C; x) 2 C£N N and each i 2 N; de…ne
which may be viewed as a generalized stand-alone cost for agent i: The formula
de…nes an additive cost-sharing method provided cost shares are always non negative.
x j ]g, this amounts to imposing the following restrictions on f j ; ¹ j for all i and x :
This claim follows easily from the inequalities
we omit the straightforward details. By construction, we have Lemma 2. Every method ' s;¹ constructed as in (9) and (10) satis…es Solidarity. If s i (0) > 0 for all i 2 N, ' s;¹ also satis…es Strict Solidarity.
Monotonicity imposes further restrictions on s; ¹:
One of them is that each s i is nondecreasing (to see this, consider in (9) a function C such that C(x i ; 0 ¡i ) = 0 for all i). Necessary and su¢cient conditions seem di¢cult to formulate in a simple way; in particular, the inequalities ¹ i¸0 are not implied. In the particular case where ¹ i is independent of both t i and x i , however, one checks that ' s;¹ meets Monotonicity if and only if s i is nondecreasing and ¹ i¸0 for all i. Then the inequalities (10) reduce to P j2Nni ¹ j · 1 for all i: Adding the requirement of symmetry, we obtain the family of methods
where 0 ·¸· 1; and s : N ! R + : When s(x i ) = 1 for all x i ; this formula reduces to (4) in Section 3.
Theorem 1*. i) Assume n¸4 and let ' be a cost-sharing method satisfying Additivity, Strict Solidarity, and Monotonicity. For all i 2 N; there exists a nondecreasing function s i : N ! R ++ and a real-valued function ¹ i such that ' = ' s;¹ ; where ' s;¹ is de…ned in (9) .
ii) Assume n¸3 and let ' be a cost-sharing method satisfying Additivity, Solidarity, Monotonicity, Zero Cost for Zero Demand, and Positive Cost for Positive Demand. For all i 2 N there exists a nondecreasing function s i : N ! R + with s i (0) = 0 < s i (1); and a real-valued function ¹ i such that ' = ' s;¹ .
Proof of Theorem 1*, statement i)
We …x throughout the proof a method ' meeting Additivity, Strict Solidarity, and Monotonicity. Recall that D is the subset of cost functions D such that D(z) = 0; 1: The second statement follows from the …rst because t i (D; x ¡i ) = x i for all i whenever x 2 @D:
Step 2. We show that for any D 2 D; i 2 N; x 2 D such that x ¡i 6 = 0; and
Monotonicity implies ' i (D; x 0 )¡' i (D; x)¸0, whereas P N (' j (D; x 0 )¡' j (D; x)) = 0 by budget balance. Thus, by Solidarity,
Choose D 0 2 D such that x 0 2 @D 0 and let ® 2 R ++ : Applying Strict Solidarity to ®D + D 0 when x i increases to x 0 i ; we obtain that signf®(' j (D;
)g is independent of j; j 6 = i; where sign(u) is 1; 0; or ¡1 if u is respectively positive, zero or negative.
By Strict Solidarity, u ¡i ¿ 0 or u ¡i = 0: In the latter case, (11) holds with¸= 0: In the former, the vector ®u ¡i + µ ¡i (x 0 ) is either strictly positive, zero, or strictly negative. Since this holds for all ® > 0; u ¡i and µ ¡i (x 0 ) are parallel and of opposite sign, and (11) holds with¸> 0.
Step 3. We show that for any two distinct i; j 2 N and any x ¡ij 6 = 0; the direction of µ ¡ij (y ij ; x ¡ij ) is independent of y ij 2 N 2 nf0g: That is, there exists ½(x ¡ij ) 2 ¢(Nnij ) such that, for all y ij 2 N 2 nf0g; µ ¡ij (y ij ; x ¡ij ) =¸½(x ¡ij ) for some¸> 0:
Take i = 1; j = 2; …x x ¡12 6 = 0; and write µ ¡12 (y 12 ; x ¡12 ) = s(y) 2 R 
Taking the di¤erence of these equalities,
This property holds for any non-comparable y; y 0 : Recall that our goal is to show that the direction of s(y) is independent of y. To this end, assume …rst that there exist y; y 
implying that L is the line borne by ½ through 0. Now s is the direction of s(t) for the six points t of our construction. We check next that s(t) is borne by ½ for any t such that t 2 · y 2 (and t 6 = 0): We just proved this under the assumption that t 1 > y There we apply (13) to t and t 0 = (t 1 ¡ 1; 1): Summing up, we have shown that if s is not constant on a given horizontal line fy j y 2 = " > 0g; then the direction of s(y) is constant on the whole band fy j y 2 · "; y 6 = 0g: If there are such integers " as large as we want, this establishes the desired statement at once. The remaining case is when there is a number " such that s is constant on every line fy j y 2 = " 0 g; "
0¸"
: For any y such that y 1 > 0; apply (13) to y and y 0 = (y 1 ¡ 1; " 0 ) where " 0¸m axfy 2 + 1; "g : we deduce that s(y) is borne by the value of s on fy j y 2 = " 0 g: The remaining case y 1 = 0 is handled similarly.
Step 4. We show that there exist n functions s i : N ! R ++ such that, for all
We begin by considering the demand pro…les x such that n(x) = n: In particular, µ(x) À 0: By Step 3, the ratio
A standard argument (omitted for brevity), shows the existence of n functions s i on Nnf0g such that
s j (x j ) for all i; j; all x: Thus the desired form µ(x) = F (x) holds whenever n(x) = n:
Next we treat the case n(x) = n ¡ 1; de…ning s i (0) in the process. Consider some x with N(x) = Nn1: For all i; j¸2; we have
where the …rst equality follows from Step 3. By Step 3 again, µ1 µ2 (x) does not depend upon x j ; for any j 6 = 1; 2; provided x j remains positive:
De…ning g i for i = 3; :::; n similarly and combining the two properties above,
for all i; j 6 = 1 and all x ¡1 À 0:
depends neither on i nor on x i : Calling this ratio s 1 (0) we now have µi µj
for all i; j. A similar construction delivers s i (0) for all i, and proves µ(x) = F (x) when n(x) = n ¡ 1:
We complete the argument by decreasing induction on n(x): Fix q; 2 · q · n ¡ 2: Assume µ(x) = F (x) whenever n(x)¸q+1 and consider x with n(x) = q; say N (x) = f1; :::; qg: For any distinct i; j 2 N nf1; ng; Step 3 and the inductive assumption imply
Note that q¸2 ensures x ¡i;j 6 = 0; as required to apply Step 3. Moreover, q · n ¡ 2 guarantees that we have at least two choices for agent 1 in N(x); ditto for agent n in NnN(x): The equality µ(x) = F (x) is now clear.
Step 5. We derive an explicit formula for '(D; x) for all D 2 D and x 2 D.
Using the notation
We show that there exist n functions¸i such that, for all D 2 D and x 2 D, '(D; x) = H(a; b); where for all i,
In Step 5.a, we prove (15) when K(D; x) = ?: In Step 5.b, we construct the functions¸i and prove (15) when jK(D; x)j = 1.
Step 5.c completes the proof by an induction argument on jK (D; x)j.
Two simple facts about H will be useful. First
) fz = H(a; b)g:
We will use the notation x ¡i = (0 i ; x ¡i ; ):
Step 5.a. When K (D; x) = ?; (15) reduces to '(D; x) = F (x): We prove this equality by induction on n(x):
The smallest possible size is n(x) = 2 : if x = x 1 e 1 ; say, then x 2 D forces ¿ 1 (D) · x 1 : So we …x x with N (x) = f1; 2g:
This is possible because
This, the symmetric property upon exchanging 1 and 2, and the fact that
Independence of Irrelevant Costs implies '(D ¤ ; x) = '(D; x); so we conclude ' ¡3 (D; x) = ¹F ¡3 (x) for some ¹¸0: Repeating this construction with coordinate 4 instead of 3 yields ' ¡4 (D; x) = ºF ¡4 (x) for some º¸0. The conclusion '(D; x) = F (x) follows as in the previous paragraph. Now the induction argument. Fix D; x such that K(D; x) = ?: Suppose t i (D; x ¡i ) = 0 , x ¡i 2 D for at least two agents, say i = 1; 2: Because K(D; x ¡i ) = ? for i = 1; 2; the inductive assumption yields '(D; x ¡i ) = F (x ¡i ) and, by (11) , ' ¡i (D; x) = F ¡i (x) for i = 1; 2: This implies '(D; x) = F (x) as above.
If t i (D; x ¡i ) = 0 for at most one i; then we can assume t j (D; x ¡j ) > 0 for j = 1; 2: We now construct x ¤ = x + e 3 and D ¤ exactly as above. This is possible because
The same argument ends the proof.
Step 5.b. We prove (15) when jK (D; x)j = 1: In this and the next substep, we use one more piece of notation: given z; z 0 2 R N ; a 2 R N ++ and two distinct i; j 2 N;
We start by choosing x with n(x) = 3; say, N(x) = f1; 2; 3g and D such that K(D; x) = f1g and x ¡1 2 D: We have drawn on Figure 3 the traces of D on the three coordinate hyperplanes. We write z = '(D; x) and z i = '(D; x ¡i ); a i = s i (x i ) for all i:
Applying (11) 
Similarly, (11) 
These three properties imply Combining (17), (20), we get
and by (16) , z = H (a; (¸1; 0 ¡1 ));
which is precisely (15) for all i; j 6 = 3; with a
Combining (21) and (18), and the fact that » a ij is an equivalence relation, we get for all i¸4;
where a i = s i (0): Now w 
Combining these properties of w
1
, including a similar equality where 3 replaces 2, and (16), we conclude
where a 1 1 = s 1 (x 1 ) and a 1 i = s i (0) for i¸2 : this is precisely (15) for (D; x 1 e 1 ): As '(D; x 1 e 1 ) only depends on x 1 and ¿ 1 (D); this establishes (15) for any (D; x) where n(x) = 1:
Next we compute z
2
. From (18) and (21), we obtain respectively
Thus (16) To complete the proof of (15) for any (D; x) such that n(x) = 3 and jK(D; x)j = 1; it only remains to take care of the case where x ¡1 = 2 D (recall we assumed x ¡1 2 D instead at the beginning of Step 5.b). Consider such a con…guration illustrated in Figure 3 . We already know that z 2 = '(D; x ¡2 ) and z 3 = '(D; x ¡3 ) are given by (15) . Applying (11) to z = '(D; x); z 2 and to z; z 3 delivers respectively the direction of z ¡2 and of z ¡3 ; hence determines z by (16) . We omit the details.
To complete Step 5.b, it remains to establish formula (15) when jK (D; x)j = 1 and n(x) > 3: We proceed by induction on n(x): The argument is essentially the same as above, once we observe that K(D; x) = f1g implies that for all i 6 = 1;
Assume the desired conclusion holds whenever n(x) · t ¡ 1 and let (D; x) be such that K(D; x) = f1g and n(x) = q: Without loss of generality, assume N(x) contains 2; 3. As before (see (21)) we de…ne a by a i = s i (x i ) for all i, and a i by a i i = s i (0) and a i j = a j for all j 6 = i: Clearly K (D; x ¡2 ) = f1g; so the inductive assumption gives
Applying (11) to z = '(D; x) and z 2 gives
The symmetrical argument involving z and z
=¸1 and the proof of Step 5.b is complete.
Step 5.c. We prove (15) where b is de…ned by b j =¸j(x j ; ¿ j (D)) if j · k, and b j = 0 otherwise. Applying (11) successively to z; z 2 and z; z 3 gives, for all i¸3;
and (16) then yields z = H(a; b); as desired.
Step 6. We construct the functions ¹ i ; i 2 N; and complete the proof. Rewrite (14) as
De…ne ¹ i ; i 2 N; by 
This formula coincides with (9) because (8) 
An additive method is entirely determined by its behavior on such pairs (D; x); thus the proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 1*, statement ii)
We …x throughout an additive method ' meeting the four axioms in the statement, denoted for brevity SOL, MON, ZCZD and PCPD. The structure of the proof , and the numbering of the corresponding steps and substeps, are identical to those of the proof of statement i): we compute µ(x) …rst, thus constructing F , then '(D; x) by constructing ¹ Some of the steps are considerably shorter, however.
Step 1. ZCZD and PCPD imply at once for all x; D;
Step 2. We show here a stronger property than (11) , namely for all x; D; i such that x i > 0 and x ¡i 6 = 0;
Note that by taking the di¤erence of (22) for x i and x 0 i , we get (11). To prove (22) and (23), we note that ' i (D; x) < ' i (D; x ¡i ) (by ZCZD and PCPD), hence
. Pick D 0 containing x but not x 0 and apply SOL to ®D + D 0 between x ¡i and x :
which contradicts PCPD for ® large enough. Thus ' j (D; x) ¡ ' j (D; x ¡i ) < 0 , j 2 N(x)ni; and for all ® > 0; all j; k 2 N (x)nfig;
we get (22) , and (23) follows.
Step 3. The direction of the vector µ ¡i (x) is independent of x i 2 Nnf0g, when x ¡i 6 = 0:
Step 4. We construct the nondecreasing functions s i such that s i (0) = 0 < s i (1) and µ(x) = F (x) for all x such that n(x)¸3:
Setting N 0 = N (x) and µ 0 (x) to be the projection of µ(x) on R N 0 ; we note that µ 0 (x) is strictly positive and in ¢(N 0 ). By Step 3,
depends on x i ; x j only, and a standard argument gives then the functions s i on Nnf0g such that µ 0 (x) = F (x) for all x such that N(x) = N 0 : The argument is essentially the same as in Step 4 of the previous proof, except that we only need N 0 to contain 3 or more agents. This is why we only need to assume n¸3 in statement ii) of Theorem 1*.
In view of Step1, it is now routine to show that the functions s i do not depend on N 0 ; and to extend the equality µ(x) = F (x) to all coordinates by setting s i (0) = 0:
Step 5. We show, as in the previous proof, the existence of functions¸i allowing the representation of '(D; x) by (15).
Step 5.a. For any (D; x) with x 2 D and K(D; x) = ?; '(D; x) = F (x): Prove this …rst for x such that N(x) = f1; 2g:
; where the latter equality follows from Independence of Irrelevant Costs.
The ascending induction on n(x) is now immediate by (22) and Step 1.
Step 5.b. We assume now jK (D; x)j = 1; and of course x 2 D: If n(x) = 1 there is nothing to prove (by ZCZD), contrary to the previous proof. If n(x) = 2; we simply copy Step 5.b to de…ne the functions¸i and compute z; z 2 ; z 3 : By Step 1 we need not worry about whether or not x ¡1 2 D: The ascending induction on n(x) is unchanged.
Step 5.c. The ascending induction on jK (D; x)j is unchanged.
Step 6. is unchanged.
8.3. Proof of Theorem 1. The "if" part of statements i) and ii) is clear. To prove the "only if" part in either statement, we assume that a method given by (9) satis…es Strong Ranking, and prove that ¹ i , hence sa ¹ i is identically zero for all i. We check …rst s i = s j for all i; j: Pick x = te N ; t¸1; and C; C(z) = 1 if n(z)¸2; C (z) = 0 otherwise. Then '(C; x) = F (x), so Strong Ranking implies s i (t) = s j (t) for t¸1: Under Zero Cost for Zero Demand, this is enough. On the other hand if n¸4; we choose x 0 = te
and the same cost function C to get s 1 (0) = s 2 (0); and we are done.
Assume now there is an agent i and
as in (28) so that sa
contradicting Strong Ranking.
Proof of Theorem 2.
Step 1. i) implies ii) and iii). Let ' be a …xed- ‡ow method. It is easy to check that ' satis…es Additivity, Separability and Monotonicity; we prove here that it also meets Submodular Solidarity and Supermodular Solidarity. Let f (:; x) be the …xed- ‡ow associated with ' and write f(:; x) = p x f(:; x) for all x 2 [0; x]: Observe that p x f(:; x + e i ) = f (:; x) for all i; all x 2 [x ¡ e i ]: We …x i; j; i 6 = j; x 2 [x ¡ e i ]; and z 2 [x ¡ e j ]: First we compare f j (z; x) and f j (z; x + e i ):
and, for k = 0; :::; x 1 ¡ 1;
The claim implies that the sequence (f 2 (z 1 ; x); z 1 = 0; ::; x 1 ), augmented by 0 as the last term, stochastically dominates (f 2 (z 1 ; x + e 1 ); z 1 = 0; ::; x 1 + 1): Using (5),this implies ' 2 (C; x)¸' 2 (C; x + e 1 ) if C is submodular and the reverse weak inequality holds if C is supermodular.
Equation (29) follows immediately from the fact that the Aumann-Shapley method satis…es Strong Dummy (see comment 2 after Theorem 2). We omit the easy proof.
To prove (30), recall the notation and formula in Example 1 and de…ne¯k = ®((k; z ¡1 ));°k = ®(x ¡ (k; z ¡1 ) ¡ e 2 ) for k = 0; :::;
Note that
:
x 1 +1 from both sides of this inequality and divide each side by a 1 to obtain the equivalent inequality in which a 1 and b 0 no longer appear. Next, using x(N)+1 = a 2 +b 1 ; a similar two-step argument reduces that inequality to the equivalent where a 2 and b 1 no longer appear. Repeating this procedure k ¡ 1 times establishes that the original inequality(30) is equivalent to
from both sides and multiplying by
; which reduces to x(N) + 1¸b k .
8.6. Statement and proof of Lemma 3. We work out the restrictions imposed by Strong Ranking and Weak Separability on formula (7). For any x 2 N N ; let ¢(x) = fy 2 ¢ jfor all i; j 2 N; x i · x j ) y i · y j g: Write fx i j i 2 N(x)g = f» 1 ; :::; » K g; where 0 < » 1 < ::: < » K ; and set » 0 = 0: For k = 1; :::; K; let N k = fi 2 N j x i¸» k g. Using this notation, the extreme points of ¢(x) are the vectors 
Proof.
Step 1. We show that an additive cost-sharing method ' satis…es Strong Ranking if and only if it possesses a shared- ‡ow representation (f; r) such that, for all x 2 N N ; z 2 [0; x[; and j 2 N; r(z; j; x) 2 ¢(x):
The "if" statement is clear from the representation in (7). Conversely, assume ' meets Additivity and Strong Ranking, and …x x 2 N N such that x 1 · ::: · x n : De…ne the linear isomorphism h : R N ! R N by h(y) = (ny 1 ; (n ¡ 1)(y 2 ¡ y 1 ); :::; 2(y n¡1 ¡ y n¡2 ); y n ¡ y n¡1 ) and observe that it maps ¢(x) into a face -(x) of ¢: For instance, if x 1 ; :::; x n are all distinct, h is an isomorphism from ¢(x) into ¢; if N = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g and x 1 = x 2 < x 3 < x 4 = x 5 ; then -(x) is the face y 2 = y 5 = 0:
De…ne Ã(C; x) = h('(C; x)) for all C 2 C. By Strong Ranking, '(C; x) is borne by a vector in ¢(x); hence Ã(C; x)¸0: Therefore Ã(:; x) is a bona …de additive cost-sharing method at x. Thus it has a shared- ‡ow representation for all C 2 C . Since h ¡1 (r(z; j; x)) 2 ¢(x); we are done.
Step 2. We complete the proof. Let ' be a cost-sharing method satisfying Additivity, Strong Ranking, and Weak Separability, and …x x 2 N N . For a 2 Nnf0g and i 2 N; consider the function ± 
By Strong Ranking '(± ae i ; x) 2 ¢(x) for all i. By (33) and the fact that b k is an extreme point of ¢(x); '(± It is interesting to compare the shared- ‡ow representation in Lemma 3 with that of separable methods given in formula (5) in Section 4. In both cases the share system r in the general formula (7) is entirely determined and the ‡ow f is arbitrary. Thus the two families of methods -separable on one hand, weakly separable and meeting Strong Ranking on the other hand-are comparably rich. In the former case, however, every ‡ow f yields a di¤erent method, whereas in the latter case di¤erent ‡ows may lead to the same method. Consider for instance the cross-subsidizing serial method ' . As a consequence, any contradiction derived for n = 3 extends to more agents by considering demand pro…les where all agents but three demand zero.
Fix thus n = 3 and let x be such that 2 · x 1 < x 2 < x 3 : Write f for f(:; x): As already noted in the proof of Proposition 1, Strong Group Monotonicity is equivalent to the property that for all D 2 D, all distinct agents i; j 2 N; and all x 2 N N ;
In the following argument, we write D _D on [0; (e x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 )]. By (34), ' 2 (D; x) · ' 2 (D; (e x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 )); hence ' 2 (D; x) = 0: By (31) again, this gives f 1 (z ¡ e 1 ) = 0 for all z such that z 1 = e x 1 + 1 and z 3 < x 3 : Since this is true for all e x 1 2 [0; x 1 [; the entire ‡ow must be contained in A = fz 2 [0; x[j z 1 = 0 or z 3 = x 3 g, that is to say f i (z) > 0 requires z 3 = x 3 or z 3 < x 3 ; z 1 = 0; and i 6 = 1: e 123 . Thus f 2 (z ¡ e 2 ) = 0 for all z such that 0 · z 1 · x 1 ¡ 1; x 1 + 1 · z 2 · x 2 ; and z 3 = x 3 : Moreover, f 3 (z ¡ e 3 ) = 0 for all z such that z 1 = 0; x 1 + 1 · z 2 · x 2 ; and z 3 = x 3 :
Gathering our results, we conclude that i) the entire ‡ow must go through the edge between (0; x 1 ; x 3 ¡ 1) and (0; x 1 ; x 3 ); i.e., f 3 (0; x 1 ; x 3 ¡ 1) = 1; and ii) within fz 2 [0; x[j z 3 = x 3 g; the ‡ow follows the path (0; x 1 ; x 3 ) ! (x 1 ; x 1 ; x 3 ) ! (x 1 ; x 2 ; x 3 ):
Finally consider D = ± (x 1 ¡1;0;x 3 ) _ ± (0;x 1 ;x 3 ) :
By the shape of the ‡ow f(:; x ¡ e 1 ) and (31), '(D; x ¡ e 1 ) = 1 3 e 123 : By the shape of f(:; x) and (31), '(D; x) = e 3 ; a contradiction to Monotonicity.
